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Abstract 
Up to the 2000s, European railway undertakings were integrated companies covering all elements of the railway system. As a 
result of the European railway packages these incumbent companies were subdivided into infrastructure managers and railway 
undertakings. The competition in the rail sector and the changing markets encouraged new companies with completely new 
business models to enter the railway market.  New regulations generated entirely new roles and this is why nowadays a lot of 
companies with very different business models are active in the railway sector. These companies cover different parts of the 
value chain and have internal as well as external interfaces. Thus, a new model to evaluate funding models under these changing 
boundary conditions is essential. The authors developed a new role model to describe internal and external financial flows in the 
rail sector focusing on the financial issues of innovation. Initially all roles in the railway sector were defined and described. A 
role is the smallest not further divisible function in the railway system. Each role assigns to one field of the railway sector 
(infrastructure, service provider, operations and rolling stock) or to the external field called environment.   A single company can 
cover multiple roles within the railway system and the former state railways with their wide product portfolio now cover 
numerous roles in the new railway system. The next step was  to evaluate the relationships between the stakeholders within the 
system and to show the resulting financial flows within the railway system. The role model allows to illustrate   the internal flows 
of a company (e.g. within integrated railway companies) as well as external flows between different undertakings.  The model 
does not differentiate between the supply of rolling stock by internal divisions or by rolling stock leasing companies for example. 
As innovations usually tackle the economics of more than one role in the system, the model clearly allocates the qualitative 
economic effects of the innovations. The illustration of the financial flows allows to derive compensation models between the 
roles gaining profit from an innovation and the roles which lose profitability. The model also allows a rough estimation of the 
transaction effort for the compensation models. Finally the authors proofed the applicability of the model in three case studies. 
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These case studies demonstrated that one of the mayor obstacles for innovation in the railway system are the missing direct 
financial flows between infrastructure and rolling stock. 
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1. Innovation in the railway sector 
Up to the 2000s, European railway undertakings were integrated companies covering all elements of the railway 
system. As result of the European railway packages these incumbent companies were subdivided into infrastructure 
managers and railway undertakings. The competition in the rail sector and the changing markets encouraged new 
companies with completely new business models to enter the railway market. The new regulation generated entirely 
new roles in the railway sector which resulted in the fact that nowadays lots of companies with very different 
business models are active in it. (Hilmola et al., 2007, Weidmann and Nash, 2008). These companies cover different 
parts of the value chain and have internal as well as external interfaces.  
Thus, a new model to evaluate the effects of policy measures and innovation funding models under these 
changing boundary conditions is essential. The authors have developed a new role model to describe internal and 
external financial flows in the rail sector focusing on the financial issues of innovation. 
2. Existing financial flow models 
Most existing financial flows models, respectively cash flow models, show the classical view of a single 
company. These models work on the basis of the company’s accounting and the main goal is to assign cost to cost 
items and activities (e.g. Navon, 1995, Francis et al. 2000) Other  models are mentioned in literature, see for 
example Hendrickson et al. (2008), which show the cash flows during the life-cycle of a product. Thus, these types 
of models describe the cash flows on a very detailed basis and do not provide an overview of an entire economic 
sector. 
For the economic assessment of investments in the railway sector, Wheat et al. (2014) summarized different 
methodologies in their book contribution. The approaches mentioned are also applicable to evaluate the overall 
feasibility of innovations. The view on the input and output of railway systems, the productivity analysis and the 
measurement of technical or cost efficiencies only deal with the entire railway system or, if the investment or 
innovation is only related to one specific sector, with the effects on this sectors. The methodologies described can 
neither depict the effects on a single company nor  the interactions between different companies.  
Most of the other assessments of the efficiencies of railways (e.g. Oum and Yu (1999), Lan and Lin (2006)) 
analyse the railway performance using data envelop analysis. Cowie and Riddington (1996) compare the different 
results of statistical assessments of railway efficiency. Depending on the type of assessment and the assessed 
performance indicator, large differences in result apply. So the relative “percentage of efficiency providing services 
1992” in Demark varies from 59.51 to 100, depending on the methodology used. Thus, these statistical approaches 
are not very reliable in general.  
Canto, Pastor et al. (2010) analysed the impact of the liberalisation in European railways on innovation. The 
assessment was based on a statistical approach using the Malmquist productivity index. They concluded that the 
entire European rail sector became more innovative, but they did not asses, under which boundary conditions 
innovations in railway are successful and which boundary leads to a failure of the innovation.   
All models described are based  on a correlation between productivity and different internal and external input 
factors and boundary conditions. But “correlations simply identify relationships, they do not indicate causality” 
(Jackson, 2008). Thus, these models are not suitable to evaluate the causalities for the failure of innovations.  
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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3. Requirements for a new model 
The existing models for economic assessments of railway innovations are quite good in describing the effects of 
innovations on the entire railway sector. But these models are unable to explain why specific innovations, which are 
expected to generate an economic benefit in the entire railway sector, are not introduced. Well known examples are 
automatic couplers for freight trains (Sünderhauf, 2009) or the introduction of noise-reduced brakes (Ilgmann, 
Lenke et al., 2011). An important reason for the failure of these innovations was the high investment combined with 
a high risk. But the introduction of specific innovations is also blocked because the interested parties in the railway 
sector expect high losses of profit in their sector as well as  high transaction costs due to  benefit sharing between the 
involved parties. For example, wagon owners reject noise reduced brakes as they expect additional operational costs 
jeopardizing their profitability (Deutsche Verkehrszeitung, 2014).  
The existing economic models cannot depict these effects within the railway sector as they are unable to clearly 
show financial flows between different parties. Thus, an entirely new qualitative model to evaluate the financial 
effects  is required. The new model has to fulfil the subsequent requirements to provide an appropriate overview of  
the relevant financial flows in the railway sector:  
x Cover all types of undertakings active in the railway sector. Which means that  not only the incumbent railway 
with a wide spread of different activities in all sections of railway business  but also new market entrants 
covering only a very specific part of the value chain like rolling-stock leasing or infrastructure maintenance need 
to be depicted in the model.  
x Internal financial flows within different divisions of an undertaking need to be shown as well as external financial 
flows between different companies. 
x Changes (increasing or decreasing) in financial flows caused by the introduction of innovations (or by other 
measures) need to be depicted transparently. 
x Missing financial links need to be identified easily. 
x The model should not be too detailed to facilitate an overview of the entire system. 
4. Role definition and assignment to the fields within the railway sector 
The financial flow model and the assignment of the interested parties are based on four fields of the railway 
system according to Weidmann (2011). Their infrastructure, operations, rolling stock and service offers are defined 
as the main resources of the railway system. As the environment in general is not required for the internal planning 
processes of railway companies, Weidmann did not consider this field in his model. But since  the description of 
financial flows requires the depiction of  the environment, it has been added to the existing model as an additional 
fifth field (see Fig. 1). 
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Fig. 1. Fields of the railway sector (according to Weidmann, 2011). 
 
In the next step the fields of the railway sector had to be subdivided to cover all possible business strategies and 
market positions of organisations in the sector. Therefore the additional level of “roles in the railway sector” was 
defined. A role is defined as the smallest, generally not further divisible function in the railway system. This means 
that a player may fill out several roles, but one single role must always be filled by one single player. A role is 
always assigned to one of the fields such as rolling stock, infrastructure, operations, service offer and environment. 
The business-objectives of a role’s owner are clearly linked to the roll itself. If a party in the railway sector covers 
more than one role, the internal conflicts between these roles must be clearly constituted in the model. 
The incumbent railways as large organizations are commonly organized in divisions and/or strategic business 
units. For infrastructure divisions, the European regulation clearly requires an organisational and financial 
independence from the other business units. But the other divisions and business units can be controlled by business 
performance, too (Johnson, Whittington et al., 2014). If the business units are controlled by performance, they do 
not differ from independent companies, and are fully accountable for their business results. Thus, the business units 
have to act like independent companies and a differentiation between business units and divisions of incumbent 
railways and new entrants is not necessary. Both may occupy a role in the same way.   
The authors defined the main roles in the railway system and the resulting optimization goals according to the 
existing differentiations as follows: 
4.1. Roles in the rolling stock field 
x Wagon owner: The wagon owner wants to buy and operate the rolling stock with the lowest possible costs. 
x Locomotive operator: The locomotive operator wants to buy and operate their locomotives with the lowest 
possible costs. 
x Rolling stock manufacturer: The rolling stock manufacturer aims at  selling as much rolling stock as possible at 
the highest revenues. 
4.2. Roles in the railway operations field 
x Train operators: Train operators want to provide train operations at the lowest possible costs. This includes low 
costs for the rolling stock and the use of  infrastructure. 
x Industry in the field of railway operations: This  role includes all suppliers of operations-related railway 
components. These are, for example suppliers of dispatching software or passenger information systems. The 
goal is to sell as many components with high revenues.  
4.3. Roles in the service offer field 
x Transport authorities: Transport authorities purchase transport services or the provision of infrastructure to be  
successful as a public service, but cannot be provided on a self-financing basis. The primary goal of the purchaser 
is to receive the  targeted service at the lowest possible cost. Furthermore the transport authorities are part of the 
public sector. Thus, they are interested in using the capacity of   the existing infrastructure in the best way 
possible.  
x Providers of transport services: The providers of transport services have an interest in  producing their 
transport services at the lowest possible costs and with the highest possible quality. They want to optimize their 
incomes from the transport services provided to existing customers or by attracting new customers. 
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4.4. Roles in the infrastructure field 
x Purchaser of infrastructure: The purchasers of infrastructure order and finance the construction and operation 
of infrastructure facilities. Their goal is to deploy the (required) infrastructure capacity with the lowest costs. 
x Infrastructure manufacturer: Infrastructure manufacturers construct  the infrastructure. They aim at  creating 
the infrastructure for given requirements as inexpensively as possible. 
x Infrastructure managers:  Maintain and operate the infrastructure. They aim at operating the infrastructure with 
the highest possible capacity to achieve as high infrastructure access fees as possible. . Furthermore, they are  
required to maintain the infrastructure with minimal costs. 
4.5. Roles in the environment field 
x Government: The primary objective of the government as policy maker is the provision of a high quality-value 
service offer with a minimal need for compensation payments. Further goals  related to the railways are the 
reduction of pollution including the reduction of noise, the reduction of energy consumption, the accessibility of 
the entire country and cheap fares for passengers and freight. 
x Regulatory bodies:  Regulatory bodies set the legal framework according to the regulatory framework given by 
the policy makers. The primary objectives of the regulatory bodies are a safe railway operation, improvement  of 
the interoperability and the guarantee of  a fair competition between  railway operating companies. Furthermore 
their objectives include measures for a modal shift from road to rail. 
x Customers: Customers benefit from  both types of transport: passenger and freight. Both groups want to get a 
good transport service  at low prices. 
 
Fig. 2. Assignment of roles to the fields of the railway sector. 
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5. Assignments of players to the different roles 
On this basis,  each player in the railway sector can be assigned to one or more roles. This allocation is shown in 
table 1 on the basis of the Swiss railway sector 
Table 1. Assignment of the main players in the Swiss railway sector to different roles. 
Field of the railway sector Infrastructure Rolling stock Operations Service offer Environment 
Roles of the players 
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SBB (entire company)  X X X X  X   X    
Section Infrastructure  X X           
Section Regional Transport    X X  X       
Section Long Distance Trains    X X  X   X    
SBB Cargo AG    X X  X   X    
Private TOCs (freight)     X  X   X    
Private TOCs (passenger)    (X) (X)  X   (X)    
Other infrastructure operators  X X           
Rolling stock leasing 
companies    (X) (X)         
Shipper in freight 
transportation    (X)     X     
Federal Office of Transport X          (X)  X 
Cantons (X)        X  X   
System providers (Siemens, 
Bombardier,…)      X  X      
Rolling stock manufacturers 
(Stadler,…)      X  (X)      
 X The mentioned player (company) has this role 
 (X) Some of the players (companies) within the mentioned group have this role 
 
6. Financial transfers between different roles 
In order to view the financial impact of measures in the rail system, the existing financial transfers must be 
described first. In this financial flow model the transfers are represented by blue arrows from the payer to the payee. 
Linked to this financial transfer, a service or the delivery of   goods takes place in the opposite direction.  
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Fig. 3. Financial flows in the today’s Swiss railway system (Bruckmann). 
 
If measures within the railway system cause a change in the economic situation of a single role, this is shown by 
a simple arrow. (Ò = increasing revenues / decreasing costs, Ô = decreasing revenues / increasing costs). If the 
beneficiary of a measure gives compensation to the payer of the measures, this will influence the financial flows. 
The arrows in the model turn red, if the financial flow gets larger. The arrow turns green, if financial flow gets 
smaller. Thus, the model easily shows the changes of the financial flows within the railway sector.  
7. Financial effects of innovations within the railway sector 
The authors tested the feasibility of the financial flow model in a study about financing models for innovations in 
the railway sector under the new regulatory context. The main topics to evaluate were : 
x Do the financial flows have an influence on the innovation activities within the railway sector? 
x Are there any suitable opportunities to compensate the financial effects between the beneficiary and the payer of 
an innovation? 
 
The authors evaluated three different innovations as case studies to answer these questions on the basis of the 
described model: 
x Energy storage on locomotives: Storage of recuperated barking energy on the locomotive to optimize the 
steering of the railway’s energy network. 
x Rapid freight trains: Fast and light freight trains with the acceleration and train dynamics comparable to 
passenger trains 
x Adaptive train control: Real-time re-scheduling of trains according to the current network status.   
8. Case study: Rapid freight trains 
To illustrate an example of  the application of the model, the financial effects of rapid freight trains will be 
described below. Rapid freight trains have the same train characteristics as passenger trains. This means a maximum 
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speed of 140 km/h, an acceleration of 0.3 to 0.7 m/s2, disc brakes, a maximum length of 400 m and a minimum 
traction force of 10 kW/t. Thus, this  type of train may increase line capacity by a more homogeneous use of train 
paths, shorter travel times and a more efficient use of the assets. On the other hand the introduction of these trains 
requires, an improved rolling stock, which is feasible to meet the requirements, is necessary. Thus, the different 
players in the railway sector are affected by the usage of rapid freight trains in different ways: 
 
x Infrastructure managers can generate more train paths through the more homogeneous train dynamics between 
passenger and freight trains running on a specific railway line. This results in higher revenues from  network 
access fees at constant infrastructure costs. 
x Wagon owners and locomotive operators have higher costs due to the purchase of new rolling stock and  the 
adaption of the existing rolling stock for higher speed.  
x Railway operators have decreasing costs according to a higher productivity. The increased train speeds lead to 
shorter travel times. Thus, the required number of staff and rolling stock decreases. 
x  Customers have to pay higher rates due to the higher quality of  transport services. 
x The providers of transport services get higher revenues due to a better quality of the provided services. 
 
These effects can be easily shown and analysed within the financial model described above. Fig. 4 shows the 
resulting effects within the financial flows.  
  
Fig. 4. Financial effects of rapid freight trains within the railway sector (Bruckmann). 
 
The model shows clearly that the main payer for rapid freight trains will be the rolling stock field (wagon owners 
and locomotive operators) whereas the main beneficiaries will be  train operators and  infrastructure managers. 
Thus, this innovation demands compensation from infrastructure managers paid to the rolling stock field..  
 
Applied to today´s real-world-situation the model clearly highlights the obstacles in introducing rapid freight 
trains: 
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x The Infrastructure managers do not provide any reductions in track access fees to freight train operators, which 
operate fast and better accelerating freight trains. On the contrary -  for freight trains which avoid overtaking 
stops due their speed and acceleration,  a 17% higher track access charge applies. Trains with less than 15 
minutes waiting times are assigned to access charge category C in spite of category D (SBB Infrastruktur – 
Fahrplan und Netzdesign, 2014).  
x Train operators improve their efficiency according to  higher speed and less time which is required for a round-
trip. The Railcare InterRegio-Cargo as a Swiss example for a rapid freight train seems to have quite short round-
trips compared to conventional freight trains (Schweizer Eisenbahnrevue, 2012). 
x Wagon owners and locomotive owners are obliged to use rolling-stock equipped for higher speeds. So they have 
face additional costs for the wagons. These additional costs have to be compensated by train operators, paying 
higher rents for locomotives and wagons. 
x As compensation from infrastructure operators cannot be expected, shippers will have to cover train operator’s  
additional costs  for the improved rolling-stock needs.  But there is only a very low willingness to pay for 
marginal reductions of transport times (Moreni, Abay et al., 2008).  
x The only application for rapid freight trains in Switzerland is  Railcare. Railcare is 100% owned by Coop, the 
largest retailer in Switzerland. 65% of all transports of Railcare are by  Coop. Thus, this train is not working in a 
real, competitive environment.  
 
The model clearly shows the main financial obstacles for rapid freight trains. There are no direct financial flows 
between infrastructure operators as main beneficiaries of the innovation and  wagon owners as main payer for this 
innovation. Furthermore, infrastructure managers nowadays don´t seem to be willing to compensate the use of an 
efficient infrastructure by reducing track access fees. Other opportunities for financial compensations are quite 
complicated and cause high transaction costs, thus these compensation models are not feasible. 
9. Conclusions 
The detailed example in the previous section and the other mentioned case-studies have shown,  that the  the 
model can be applied to illustrate financial-flows within and between companies of the railway sector. The 
beneficiaries and the payers of policy measures and innovations can easily be identified.  
The model fulfils requirements, which are described in chapter 3. It can be applied  to integrate railway 
companies as well as  new market entrants with very different business models. The  model is detailed enough  to 
achieve the required results on a macroscopic level. The role definitions are adaptable, so that the allocation  of  
roles can be ajusted to different requirements of the investigated system .  Thus, the model is highly suitable  to 
show financial obstacles within policy or innovation processes.  
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